The U.S. Produce Industry As Florida's largest shipper of strawberries, Wish Farms was a major player in the U.S. produce industry. Broadly defined, produce includes fruits, vegetables, and tree nut crops. According to the USDA, the average annual value of the crop from 2005-2007 was $36.5 billion. As shown in Exhibit 1, crops of particular importance included apples, oranges, strawberries, and lettuce. According to a USDA study, between 1976 and 1999, per capita demand for fresh fruits and vegetables in the U.S. grew by over 30%.
Produce crops generally had characteristics that were quite different from cereal crops, such as wheat and corn, or other field crops, such as soybeans and alfalfa. To begin with, field crops tended to be grown for processing and/or animal feed, rather than being consumed fresh by humans. The meant that field crops were generally easier to store and transport. Field crops also tended to be harvested mechanically, whereas many types of produce needed to be picked by hand. Finally, field crops tended to be grown over large acreages, such as the great plains of the U.S. and Canada while most produce were grown intensively in specific areas. California was a major player in many different types of produce. Other states, including Florida, were major players for specific crops such as citrus and strawberries.
Even in areas where a particular type of produce is grown locally, it is unlikely to be available throughout the year. As a result, certain regions ship most of their product. Exhibit 2, for example, shows how strawberry production varies throughout the year between California, Florida and Mexico. As a consequence, it is often difficult to know the source of a particular produce item that appears on a grocery store shelf.
Produce Industry Structure
The large variety of produce types, locations and growing conditions within the industry led to complex supply chains. As illustrated in Exhibit 3, the grower/shipper component of the supply chain (itself composed of growers, shippers and consolidated grower/shippers) could sell to a variety of outlets, including:
• General grocery wholesalers, who would in turn sell to retail outlets (e.g., grocery stores) as part of a general product line • Produce wholesalers, who would in turn sell to either grocery stores or food service operations, such as restaurants and cafeterias.
• General foodservice wholesalers, who would in turn sell produce to food service operations as part of a general product line • Direct sales to grocery stores • Direct sales to foodservice operations • Directly to consumers, although this was a small fraction of the total market.
• Export market, either directly, through brokers, or through wholesalers.
Although there was some evidence that the industry was gradually growing more consolidatedparticularly on the retailer/food service side-it remained relatively fragmented overall. Even this, however, varied considerably by crop. For example, according to the USDA, the California grape industry had 149 shippers in 1999 with the largest accounting for only 6% of all shipments. On the other hand, 76% of bagged salad sales were accounted for by the top two companies. The high level of industry fragmentation, particularly among grower/shippers meant that identifying the origins of a particular item of produce (e.g., on the grocer's shelf or served at a restaurant) was very difficult. According to IbisWorld industry reports, the concentration of grower/shippers remained very low in 2010, with no single company accounting for more than 2% of the market.
Produce Traceability Initiative (PTI)
With the growth in the demand for fresh produce and the desire to maintain year round supply, the complexity of the supply chain for produce necessarily increased. With this growth in complexity, identifying the source of food-borne pathogens-such as E. coli and salmonella bacteria-that could occasionally infect produce became increasingly difficult. Ironically, although today's food system was safer than it had ever been in human history, the visibility of the outbreaks that did occur had never been greater. Problems that had once been highly localized to the growing area could now become national or international in scope, as illustrated by the examples in Exhibit 4.
Because problems such as those described in the exhibit tended to provoke consumer responses that were far out of proportion to the actual food-safety risks, grower associations that accounted for the vast majority of North American produce-including the Produce Marketing Association (PMA), the Canadian Produce Marketing Association (CPMA), UnitedFresh, and GS1-US, a nonprofit organization that manages and registers barcodes, -joined together to create the Produce Traceability Initiative (PTI). The purpose of the PTI was to develop a system whereby produce could be identified with the producer (and even the field) from which it originated. The details of the initiative are described in a PTI pamphlet included as Exhibit 5.
According to the timetable established by the PTI, growers were expected to label each produce case by 2012. While Wishnatzki expected to be in compliance with this milestone, he anticipated that many growers had yet to establish their system. Initially, he anticipated that major chain retailers-such as Publix, headquartered in nearby Lakeland, Florida-would be lenient on suppliers who were not in full compliance. There would come a time, however, when over half of all producers would be labeling their cases properly. At that point, Wishnatzki anticipated that retailers would begin insisting on PTI labeling on all produce. Shipments lacking such labeling might then be refused. He guessed that such demands could occur as soon as the summer of 2012.
Wish Farms
Wish Farms evolved from a company founded by Harris Wishnatzki, a Russian immigrant who began by selling produce from a cart in in New York City during the early part of the 20 th century. In 1929 he and his partners, the Nathel family, established a produce shipping operation in central Florida-one of the principal produce growing areas in the U.S. By the early 1980s, Gary Wishnatzki, a grandson of Harris, had become president of Wishnatzki & Nathel.
Under Wishnatzki's leadership, the firm established a farming subsidiary in 1987, G & D Farms, which originally focused on strawberries. Over time, these farming operations demanded a growing percentage of management time. By 2001, the company decided to split its distribution business-which operated mainly out of New York by descendants of the Nathel family-from its farming and shipping operations in Florida. Wishnatzki turned his attention to the Florida business, now doing business as Wishnatzki Farms. Under his leadership, the company pursued many new initiatives. As described on the company web site (http://www.wishfarms.com/about-us), these included:
In 2003, Wishnatzki joined forces with Allen Williford to form Clear Choice Greenhouses, providing organically grown strawberries from a safe, soil-less growing medium. The operation began with a 1-acre greenhouse. The enterprise has been a platform for innovation and experimentation into new ways to grow organic strawberries. In 2006, 13 acres of outside organic strawberry production was added to help meet the demand. Another 6 acres of strawberries in high-clearance tunnels was added the next year. Wishnatzki Farms has entered into the processed strawberry business in recent years. In 2007 the company opened a processing facility to supplement out-sourced production capacity.
The FreshQC quality control and traceability solution was pioneered by Wishnatzki in 2008. The patent pending system allows for a consumer unit to be traced back to the picker that picked it. It has been proven to increase quality through accountability.
In 2010, the Wish Farms consumer brand was established and became the new name of Wishnatzki Farms. This represented a milestone for the company and a major challenge. Traditionally, retailers such a grocery chains had been reluctant to support or emphasize branded produce. The reasons for this were twofold. First, when customers became attached to a brand, they tended to blame the retailer when it was not in stock (rather than the growing season). Thus, attempts to push a particular brand that was not available year-round were discouraged. Second, brand loyalty could translate to supplier-power, making it harder for the retailer to negotiate when the same brand could be purchased elsewhere.
To address the concern of year-round availability, Wish Farms established secondary sources for its key products-strawberries, blueberries, green bell peppers, and grape tomatoes-in locations with different growing seasons, such as California. With a growing amount of acreage either managed or under contract with 3 rd party growers, the challenge of managing the logistics of the operation demanded increasingly sophisticated IT solutions. These were largely addressed through the company's VirtualOne division, which was responsible for the company's technology initiatives.
VirtualOne Division
The VirtualOne division of Wish Farms was established in 2006 as an LLC that was intended to create technologies that could serve to support both internal operations and act as independent sources of revenue. The first three initiatives of this division were the FreshQC solution, VirtualOne ERP software, and FireTag. All three contributed to the company's PTI-compliance efforts and supported its branding initiatives as well.
The FreshQC project was built around a software module intended to link produce to its source. It was originally developed for strawberries, where pickers actually placed berries into a consumer package. At the time of picking, a label with a 16-digit code was applied to each of these packages. The consumer could then go to the company's web site and enter a 4-digit pick code, as illustrated in Exhibit 6. Based on the code, the consumer could find out more about the product that he or she had purchased. In addition, the consumer could provide feedback that would be returned to Wish Farms and the grower. During its first full year of operation, 1,300 feedback forms were received. In the second year, that number more than doubled, to 3,100. Not only did this initiative establish the type of virtuous cycle that could cement brand loyalty, it also provided precisely the type of product traceability that would be required by the upcoming PTI.
The VirtualOne ERP system was a custom developed package supporting the company's sales, finance, human resources, and inventory processes. It was intended not only for internal use, but also as a product that could be sold to other produce growers and shippers. With its built-in traceability functionality, it was better positioned to meet the needs of these types of companies than the generic ERP packages that were normally sold for small and medium sized companies. By 2011, the ERP software was in use at Wish Farms and was in the final stages prior to product release.
The FireTag system was intended to automate the labeling of individual produce cases. Combining IT, robotics, and laser technology, it represented the company's most ambitious technology development project to-date.
FireTag: Laser Marking Technology
Central to the PTI process was an identifying label applied to individual produce cases. The main component of each label was a GS1-registered bar code identifying the produce type, the producer, and the specific source. The originators of the PTI standards envisioned that these labels would be printed locally then manually applied to each box on a pallet that would typically hold a stack of 30 to 60 produce boxes. There were, however, a number of challenges associated with this process. These included the following:
1. Applying labels manually could take considerable time. This was of particular concern at large operations where all the trucks from the individual farms tended to arrive at the receiving area around the same time, when the day's picking was done. Delays in processing the incoming pallets could keep trucks near the end of the queue waiting for hours, an expensive proposition.
2. Label printing required quite a few consumables (e.g., label stock, ink), generated considerable waste (e.g., label backing), and there were limits to how far in advance labels could be prepared, since the number of pallets arriving from a particular grower would not necessarily be known until the truck arrived.
3. Labels often needed to be applied under conditions that made it likely the occasional label would not adhere properly. For example, some producers might apply them near the field-where it was frequently hot and humid-whereas others might apply them in a cooler where temperatures were kept just above freezing to maintain produce freshness and reduce spoilage. Once PTI became the de facto standard, Wishnatzki anticipated that a missing label might cause an entire case to be rejected by the retailer or-in the worst case-might cause the retailer to refuse delivery on an entire pallet.
Originally, to address the first of these items, Wishnatzki had anticipated developing an automatic labeling system. Bob Pitzer, a senior engineer who worked for the company, was an expert in robotics and was asked to consider the problem. It soon became clear that there would be a number of obstacles. First, whether a label was applied mechanically or by hand, it would take some time to ensure proper adhesion. This time would be even greater where produce crates were involved, since a box could easily be deformed both by the produce inside and by the weight of boxes stacked on top of it on the pallet, meaning that application would need to accommodate any curvature of the location where the label was to be applied. Furthermore, even automating the labeling process would not address the waste and adhesion challenges previously mentioned.
There were also a couple of competing approaches that the company considered. One was using an ink jet to apply label information. Although this technique could be done quickly, it tended to be very sensitive to dirt, humidity, and condensation. Unfortunately, these conditions were a daily fact of life in agriculture.
Another common solution to product tracking was the use of radio-frequency ID (RFID) tags. The potential advantage of this approach was that an entire collection of objects-in other words, an entire pallet-could be scanned at once, at least in theory. The use of these tags, however, would not solve the problem of applying tags to each case. Moreover, even the most aggressive proponent of the technology-Walmart-was forced to relax a 2003 mandate that all its vendors use RFID as a result of technical issues and vendor resistance.
FireTag Technology
The alternative solution that Pitzer developed involved using a laser to "burn" the bar code and other product information on to each case that was stacked on the pallet. The technology involved a number of key components:
1. A special film coating had to be applied to the label area of each case during the box printing process.
2. A high powered laser-similar to the type used to mark product and date codes on plastic bottles on soft drink assembly lines-needed to be acquired.
3. A robotic system needed be developed that would allow the laser to move up, down and around each pallet so that each case could be marked.
4. A sensing system was required to locate the laser-sensitive film on each box in order to fine tune the laser's position-needed because label position could vary significantly between pallets as a result of shifting and case deformation.
5. A software application was needed in order to provide the operator with easy control over the information used to mark each case and set up the pallet configuration.
The resulting system is shown in Exhibit 7. A video produced by the company that shows FireTag in action is included as Exhibit 8. Selected screen captures from the FireTag software are presented in Exhibit 9.
FireTag as a Product
As the demonstrated capabilities of the FireTag system became evident, the company recognized that the technology was a valuable not only as an internal tool, but as a product in its own right. The benefits of the FireTag system over existing approaches to PTI labeling were many, as described in Exhibit 10. The "green" aspects of the technology fit very well with the organic produce initiatives of Wish Farms. The system's speed was high enough to reduce bottlenecks at the loading dock. Moreover, the company was continuing to develop techniques for increasing speed. For example, by installing a more powerful label, the company could reduce the "burn time" per case from about a second to 0.3 seconds-leading to a savings of over 30 seconds in marking a typical pallet. It was also possible to run the system with two opposing lasers, cutting the marking time in half. These savings appeared to be small in absolute terms but when multiplied by the number of cases packed yearly by a large producer such as Dole (on the order of 40 million) they represented a material contribution to supply chain efficiency.
Construction
The fabrication of FireTag system components was contracted to GEMCITY, a well-respected firm that specialized in design-and-build projects and contract manufacturing. The most expensive component of the system was the laser, purchased from another vendor, which accounted for 20-40% of the cost of a particular system. Because laser systems were heavily scrutinized by the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), extra care had to be taken to ensure that users of the system could not accidentally become exposed to it.
The development of the FireTag software, the main component of which was built on Microsoft's .NET platform, was contracted out to third-party developers. Pitzer maintained nearly daily contact with the developers to ensure needed functionality was included and to report errors.
A key element of the FireTag design was portability. Most locations in the U.S. have only one or two harvests a year. Unfortunately, that meant that a fixed system could only be used for a few months a year, making it hard to recoup the up-front investment. By making the system easily transportable, it became possible to use the system nearly year-round in locations such as California, where the growing seasons of different crops in various micro-climates were spaced throughout the year.
Value proposition
In fact, the value offered by the FireTag system came from a number of sources, each of which was likely to vary considerably according to the individual customer's situation. These included the following:
1. Time savings in applying PTI markings. As already noted, FireTag was much faster than human or mechanical application of labels. The value of this additional speed was less a matter of the per-hour cost of creating and applying labels than of the impact of labeling delays on the efficiency of other loading and unloading activities.
Consumable costs:
Once again, the problem was less likely to be a matter of the direct cost of labels and waste disposal than that of timing, such as replacing label stock and print cartridges. When a line of trucks was waiting to unload, the minutes required to replace these consumables could be very costly.
Costs of unreadable or missing labels:
Particularly as retailers began to adhere strictly to PTI requirements-expected to occur by the end of 2012-a missing label or smeared ink jet barcode could lead to the rejection of a particular case-whose value might range from $10 to $100, depending on the contents-at the retailer's loading dock. In the worst case scenario, an entire pallet of produce-potentially worth $4,000-$5,000 for a high-value crop such as strawberriescould be refused if too many cases lacked readable markings.
Variations in these sources of benefit meant that a "typical" value number was impossible to determine. For example, if a grower/shipper of a crop had a small operation-one that was not usually subject to tieups at the loading dock-that focused on a crop that having relatively low value/box and reasonable shelf life, the biggest source of value would likely be direct: the labor and consumable savings associated with printing and applying labels. On the other hand, a high volume producer of a highly perishable, high value/box crop might realize much greater indirect value: from improved efficiency and reduced retailer rejection rate.
Pricing model
Given the variability of the value proposition for the FireTag system, Rob Ogilbee made projections using a pricing model that he felt would be attractive to most potential customers. It involved three main types of revenue:
• A per-unit fee, based upon adding a small margin (<10%) to the cost paid by FireTag, LLC to its third party equipment suppliers who actually constructed the setup. Depending on the setup (e.g., power of lasers, single or dual laser), the equipment price to the customer was expected to range from $180,000 to $300,000.
• A per-mark fee of $0.01 per case labeled. This was automatically calculated by the software and supplied to the company over the internet, so the customer could be billed
• A software licensing fee Of these fees, nearly all contribution was expected to come from the per-mark fee, since the licensing fees and equipment margins were both expected to be low and would mainly offset the company's own expenses. FireTag, LLC also expected to pass transportation and setup costs to the customer.
An alternative approach to pricing would be to lease, rather than sell, the system. Leasing, either as a standard practice or as an option, could make the system more attractive to customers by reducing its up-front cash requirements. Naturally, this would also place heavier cash demands on FireTag LLC/Wish Farms.
Another potential source of revenue-albeit highly speculative-was the data that was generated by the system. Published estimates of produce output and value, such as those prepared by the USDA, were highly unreliable. They were also not timely. If a substantial number of grower/shippers were to use the system, however, the mark information transmitted for billing purposes could also serve as a basis for estimating crop production in real time. This information would certainly be of value to growers and retailers. On the other hand, it might also represent a potential obstacle to the sale of FireTag systems. Large grower/shippers might be reluctant to share such information about their own activities unless appropriate safeguards were put in place.
Target customers
Based on the characteristics of the FireTag system, there appeared to be two categories of customers for whom the product would provide particular value:
1. Large regional grower/shippers specializing in perishable, high value crops. Wish Farms, with its major presence in central Florida-where many vegetables are grown year-round-and its strong position in the strawberry market was an example of such a company.
2. Large national or multinational grower/shippers that operated in multi-season regions-such as California-that would allow the system to be transported and operated throughout most of the year.
In addition, there was the long-term potential for international sales-after the 2011 E. Coli deaths, Europe was becoming highly receptive to greater traceability. There was also the possibility that the system might be used for marking cases in entirely different industries. The challenge here was identifying the types of products that derived the greatest value from the capabilities that the FireTag system offered.
Current Situation
By late fall 2011, a number of FireTag prototypes had been completed and the company prepared for its first full-scale field test. By that time, around $1 million had been invested in the product's development. Ogilbee estimated that the additional cash requirements of bringing the FireTag system to market could range from:
• $2-3 million, assuming that customers purchase the system
• Up to $10 million, assuming that customers lease the system-meaning that the initial costs of constructing the systems would be born entirely by FireTag, LLC Included in these costs were the costs of acquiring the key components (e.g., from GEMCITY and the laser manufacturers), the costs of marketing the product, and the ongoing costs of further development.
Up to this point, Wish Farms had underwritten the entire cost of FireTag development. Now that a workable prototype was available for internal use, however, it made sense to ask if third parties were willing to invest in the costs of bringing FireTag to market. If not, would it make sense to continue viewing the system as a product?
There were a number of different avenues for funding that FireTag, LCC might pursue. The most promising of these included the following:
1. Supplier funding: A number of the key component suppliers for FireTag-most notably GEMCITY and the laser manufacturer-would stand to gain significant business if FireTag achieved substantial market penetration. Given this synergistic benefit, would they consider investing in the company-either directly or through supplying components in exchange for equity? Another potential investor was the manufacturer of the film used for laser marketing. Not only would widespread use of the system lead to per-box revenue for that company, it would also serve as a demonstration of the product that might be applied to other industries seeking to mark their cases.
2. Grower/Shipper funding: Several large grower/shippers had expressed considerable interest in the FireTag system. One major player had seemed almost mesmerized by the demonstration video (Exhibit 8) which had been playing in a continuous loop at the FireTag booth at a major produce trade show.
Retail customer funding:
For retailers, such as grocery chains, compliance with PTI requirements was seen as a particularly pressing challenge. The benefits of FireTag could give them an incentive to speed its penetration into the market. Perhaps that could be used to make a case for an investment-although the window for this particular opportunity was likely to be short-lived.
Third-party investor funding:
FireTag was a proven technology-as shown by the prototypethat was protected by patents (still under review) and met an important need-PTI compliance. For these reasons, investment in the system could be seen as a relatively safe bet, once the size of the potential market could be determined. Unfortunately, agribusiness was not normally seen as an attractive area for venture investors, who tended to prefer high-growth sectors such as information technology and medicine. Nevertheless, reasonably good returns without huge risk had proven to be elusive during the economic downturn that began in 2007 and the agricultural sector in the U.S. was currently strong.
Wish Farms:
As a last resort, the company itself might consider further investment in the product. From Wishnatzki's perspective, however, a great deal of the value of the product had already been realized by virtue of its availability for his own operations. Did he need to double down by further funding its entrance into the market?
Many of the questions surrounding FireTag's future hinged on the potential size and attractiveness of the market. Ogilbee had prepared his own projections, showing a strong rate of return. It would be useful, however, to get some additional insights into the matter. In the fall of 2006 there was a major E. coli outbreak in spinach. The outbreak was first recogninized in late August and led to over 100 hospitalizations and at least one death. This major outbreak showed the inefficiencies in our food supply regarding traceability and identifying the origin of contaminated product. Over 30 suppliers of fresh spinach recalled all porduct being produced in a 6 week period. This recall not only hurt all suppliers of fresh spinach, but forced consumers to question the safety of fresh fruit and vegetables.
Supposed Salmonella in Tomatoes (2008)
In June of 2008, anotehr foodborne illness outbreak occurred; this time the suspect was tomatoes. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) first received reports that a dozen people across nine states were sickened by salmonella linked to consumption of raw tomatoes. That dozen turned into close to 200 reported cases in less than a week. Furthermore, the origin of the contaminated product was unclear, leaving millions of containers of tomatoes in question. This resulted in a devastatating impact on the industry and, once again, chipped away at consumer confidence. After months of investigations, it turned out to be jalapeno pepper that was carrying the samonella. Nevertheless, the event severely impacted tomato growers across the U.S.
E. Coli in Lettuce (2010)
In May 2010 romaine lettuce was found contaminated with E. coli. It was immediately linked to romaine lettuce being distributed by Freshway Foods with a "use by date of May 12". They had a list of chain stores and food service companies that purchased the contaminated product to minimize the number of cases. It is estimated that 19 to 39 people from a two or three state area may have been affected by the product.
E. Coli in Europe (2011)
Most recently, the E. coli outbreak that hit Europe in the spring of 2011 highlights the need for and benefits of traceability. It took over a week once the suspect Fenugreek seeds were identified as the cause to trace them back to their source. The seeds were sold to a distributor which, in turn, sold them to 70 different companies in 12 different countries. It took weeks to track all the seeds down. Had case-level
Exhibit 10: Features and Benefits of FireTag
• Green Technology (No consumables) o Laser head burns mark on box. This mark contains a GS1 barcode and human readable element. There are no disposables or wasted labels.
• Eliminates bottlenecks in label application
o Marking speed of FireTag is under one second. This allows the user to handle surges in volume without increasing labor. There are no labels to print, distribute or track.
• Minimizes human element with automation o FireTag is fully automated and can identify and mark varying pallets of product with no human interaction. FireTag manages the full process once the product is positioned on rollers.
• Can be used in the receiving dock, the cooler, or shipping exit o This flexibility allows you to mark the product in the area that is best for the customer's needs.
• Heavy duty, functions in harsh environment
o FireTag is fabricated with high quality materials. It is constructed to operate in the most demanding conditions. o Made of steel, FireTag is durable with an IP 65 electrical rating; resistant to water, dust and dirt.
• Easily transportable from one operation to the next o FireTag is constructed to be easily transported by a standard trailer. It takes up about 6 pallet spaces and requires very little assembly and breakdown from one operation to the next. o Designed for heavy utilization and low maintenance.
• Software is configured for rapid data collection o FireTag is tailored to mark and collect data quickly. It can be modified for any operation to maximize efficiency and ease of use.
• Internet enabled
o FireTag is connected to the Internet and can stream data to any designated computer and be maintained by a remote operator.
Options:
• Custom software configuration • Dual lasers for increased pallet marking speeds • Future application development will be tailored to solve any PTI requirements Source: FireTag LLC Internal Memorandum
